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The existing studies on Green Paradox and stranded assets focus on dirty exhaustible assets
(fossil fuel reserves) and show that environmental regulations, by changing the costs of dirty
inputs relative to clean ones, lead to replacements of the former by the latter and stranding of
dirty assets due to perfect substitution. It, in turn, induces acceleration of dirty resource
extractions and pollution emissions for fear of dirty assets becoming stranded - the Green
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accumulation with investment irreversibility. We show that if 1) direct irreversibility of
investment does not rule out the indirect channel of converting dirty capital goods into clean
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Capital Accumulation, Green Paradox,
and Stranded Assets: An Endogenous Growth Perspective

Abstract: The existing studies on Green Paradox and stranded assets focus on dirty exhaustible
assets (fossil fuel reserves) and show that environmental regulations, by changing the costs of dirty
inputs relative to clean ones, lead to replacements of the former by the latter and stranding of dirty
assets due to perfect substitution. It, in turn, induces acceleration of dirty resource extractions
and pollution emissions for fear of dirty assets becoming stranded - the Green Paradox effect.
This paper uses an endogenous growth framework to revisit the problem of Green Paradox and
stranded assets by taking a new perspective that focuses on capital accumulation with investment
irreversibility. We show that if 1) direct irreversibility of investment does not rule out the indirect
channel of converting dirty capital goods into clean ones through final goods allocations, and
2) interactions between dirty and clean capital as imperfect substitutes can generate reciprocal
effects, then environmental regulation, through directing investment towards clean capital, does
not necessarily leads to asset stranding of dirty capital. Accumulation of clean capital with
a pollution-saving effect offsets the polluting impact of dirty one and leads to reversed Green
Paradox. We further propose an endogenous growth mechanism through which the accumulation
of both dirty and clean capital, as well as environmental improvement, can be sustained in the
long run without converging to the steady state.
Key words: Endogenous Growth; Green Paradox; Stranded Assets; Capital Accumulation;
Imperfect Substitution; Investment Irreversibility
JEL Classification: Q54; Q43; Q32; O13; O44; C61
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1

Introduction

Most of the economies in the course of development tend to adopt capital investment as a primary
growth engine, given that the supply-side push through massive capital investment is arguably effective to deliver rapid expansion of production capacities in manufacturing sectors such as petroleum,
chemical, steel, cement, machinery, equipment, and apparatus (e.g., Lucas, 1988; Barro and Sala-iMartin, 2004; Acemoglu, 2009). However, this growth model is also challenged as turning a blind
eye towards its environmental impacts, since capital deployed in these sectors is generally coined as
“dirty” that leads to pollution emissions and damages (e.g., World Bank, 1997; Liu and Diamond,
2005; Ebenstein et al., 2015). To correct for pollution externality associated with dirty capital,
environmental regulations such as pricing pollution is crucial, but shifts in environmental regulatory
regime will induce shocks to the dirty capital assets (e.g., Pfeiffer et al., 2016; van der Ploeg, 2016b).
Then a critical question arises: do environmental regulations necessarily lead to an outcome
where the dirty production capital has to be phased out and becomes worthless, i.e., the so-called
asset stranding of dirty capital? Studies on stranded assets find that environmental regulations by
changing the costs of dirty fossil fuels relative to clean renewable backstops, lead to replacements
of the former by the latter (due to perfect substitution) and stranding of dirty assets. For example,
ambitious climate policies such as tough carbon budgets for the 2◦C global warming target might
lead to asset stranding for a substantial share of fossil resource reserves (e.g., Allen et al., 2009;
McGlade and Ekins, 2015; van der Ploeg, 2018). Meanwhile, a key issue related to stranded assets
is the so-called Green Paradox phenomenon: suppliers of polluting non-renewable resources such
as fossil fuel, when anticipating stringent pollution regulations, would increase extraction for fear of
their reserves becoming worthless (stranded), thus leading to acceleration of pollution emissions and
counteracting the effect of well-intended environmental policies in the short run (Sinn, 2008, 2015).
Basically, the focus of the existing studies is on suppliers of dirty fossil resources (a supply-side
approach), the Green Paradox effect and stranded dirty assets primarily stem from the assumption
of perfect substitution between dirty fossil fuels and clean renewable backstops (e.g., Gerlagh, 2011;
Smulders et al., 2012; van der Ploeg, 2016a; van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2012a, 2014). However,
the validity of that assumption is subject to further scrutiny, and more recent studies show that a
Green Paradox outcome is more likely to occur if the existing degree of substitutability is moderate
or high, and if the current degree of substitutability is near zero, then there will be no Green
Paradox outcome (e.g., Gerlagh, 2011; Long, 2014; van der Meijden, 2014). Accordingly, the
degree of substitutability between dirty and clean capital matters, and it is essential to consider
the case where dirty and clean capital interacts as imperfect substitutes.
1
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First, imperfect substitution in demand for fossil fuels may arise from concerns with the
security of energy supplies, diversification, and intermittency of renewable backstops (van der
Ploeg and Withagen, 2012b). Second, the long-lived and strong path dependence and carbon
lock-in in the energy market leads to imperfect substitution between the incumbent dirty assets
and competing clean ones (Unruh, 2000, 2002; Fouquet, 2016).1 Third, a growing attention has
been paid to building clean capital assets such as carbon capture and storage (CSS) facilities and
solar geoengineering technologies that can break the link between dirty capital (fossil fuel power
plants) and pollution damages (climate change) (e.g., Anderson and Newell, 2004; van der Zwaan
and Gerlagh, 2009; Herzog, 2011; Moreno-Cruz, 2015, 2013; Moreno-Cruz and Smulders, 2017;
Moreno-Cruz et al., 2017; Heutel et al., 2016, 2018).2 In this sense, dirty and clean capital can
coexist and serve as imperfect substitutes or gross complements.
From this perspective, we argue that clean capital might not necessarily serve as perfect
substitutes to dirty one, and imperfect substitution may generate different results regarding the
Green Paradox effect and stranded dirty assets. On the one hand, the clean capital, by reducing
emissions and pollution damages to physical equipment (equipment maintenance effects), can
help improve productivity and economic values of dirty capital. On the other hand, productivity
improvement of the dirty capital leads to increases in final goods outputs which in turn provide
more resources for clean capital investment. This reciprocal mechanism thus creates an outcome
where stringent environmental regulations might create demands for the accumulation of both
dirty and clean capital, not necessarily leading to asset stranding of the dirty capital.
Furthermore, the more recent studies investigate stranded assets and the Green Paradox from
the perspective of capital investors and highlight the role of capital irreversibility: if dirty capital
1

Intuitively, prior to the date of clean regime invention, the dirty regime as the first mover has accumulated
a substantial installed base of production capacities, technology varieties and end users in the energy market,
which further delivers a higher level of utility to the upcoming households adopting the dirty regime. As a result,
the households tend to adopt the incumbent dirty regime that can deliver a larger level of electric utility through
the network externality, and lead to a substantial inertia against the competing clean regime - the so-called carbon
lock-in (Unruh, 2000, 2002).
2
Anderson and Newell (2004) show that CCS is technically feasible, with current costs of about $200 to $250
per ton of carbon. Although currently a relatively expensive mitigation option, CCS could be attractive if a
stringent carbon policy is put in place, if CCS turns out inexpensive relative to other options, or if it is desired
to retain fossil fuels as part of the energy mix. Near-term prospects favor CCS for electric power plants and certain
industrial sources with storage in depleted oil and gas reservoirs, and deep aquifers may provide an attractive
longer-term-storage option. Meanwhile, as compared to traditional climate regulations such as mitigation (Nordhaus,
1991; William, 1992), climate geoengineering is commonly referred to as “carbon dioxide removal and sequestration”,
see National Research Council (2015a,b) for a survey of methods and their implications. Climate geoengineering is
quicker for decreasing atmospheric carbon dioxides, and cheaper than mitigation especially when looking at direct
costs alone. Direct costs are estimated to be in the order of billions of dollar a year to turn down global average
temperatures to pre-industrial levels, compared to trillions for mitigation (e.g., National Research Council, 2015a,b)

2
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cannot be converted into clean one,3 then it is optimal to stop investing in dirty capital earlier and
make a shift to investment into the clean sector to avoid later stranding of assets in dirty production
sectors, and capital irreversibility on the demand side enhances the effect of environmental regulations on emission reductions in the short term, thus leading to reverse Green Paradox (Baldwin
et al., 2018; van der Ploeg and Rezai, 2018). As a departure, our works in this paper distinguish
irreversibility between direct and indirect channels: while dirty capital cannot be directly converted
to clean one, there might exist a channel of indirect convertibility through which dirty capital
can be used to produce final goods which in turn provide resources for clean capital investment.4
In the context mentioned above, we hence have the following critical questions to be addressed:
Does stringent environmental regulation necessarily lead to Green Paradox and asset stranding of
dirty capital? How could imperfect substitution between clean and dirty capital affect the Green
Paradox effect and stranded capital assets? What’s the impact of direct and indirect irreversibility
of investment on capital accumulation? Under which conditions could accumulation of both dirty
and clean capital be sustained?
Our objective is to provide answers to each of these questions by investigating Green Paradox
and stranded capital assets from a perspective of capital accumulation with the irreversibility of
investment. We draw on the two-sector Lucas endogenous growth model (e.g., Uzawa, 1965; Lucas,
1988; Sergio, 1991; Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Caballe and Santos, 1993), and adapt it to a
canonical problem of green growth that features interactions between dirty and clean capital. The
dirty capital is productive to final goods production but polluting to the environment, and the
clean capital has a pollution-saving effect and serves as an imperfect substitute to the dirty one.
Final goods produced by both dirty and clean capital are allocated towards capital investment
with irreversibility. Investments in both dirty and clean capital are endogenously determined by
their corresponding shadow values. The results are summarized as follows.
First, if capital investment is subject to both direct and indirect irreversibility, then the
accumulation of clean capital and its effect on protecting the economic values of dirty capital
would vanish. In this case, stringent environmental regulations that correct for pollution damages
will lead to asset stranding of dirty capital. In contrast, if the investment is only subject to
direct irreversibility (i.e., dirty capital goods itself cannot be directly converted into clean ones),
then the channel of indirect convertibility still exists through which dirty capital can be used to
3

For example, equipment, machinery and facilities installed in coal-fired power plants (dirty capital) cannot
be directly deployed in solar PV facility or windmills as clean capital.
4
For example, equipment, and facilities installed in coal-fired power plants, while cannot be directly converted
to solar PV facility or windmills, can be used to produce final goods that can be used to invest in solar PV facility
or windmills.

3
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produce final goods which are in turn allocated towards clean capital investment. In this case,
accumulation of the clean capital can create a shadow value premium vis-à-vis dirty one, and it
is thus optimal to direct resources available for investment away from dirty capital towards clean
one and accumulate both capital stocks simultaneously.
It, in turn, generates reciprocal effects. On the one hand, accumulation of dirty capital as an
imperfect substitute can increase productivity and economic values of dirty one (through equipment
maintenance effects) and thus encourage the further accumulation of dirty capital. On the other
hand, accumulation of dirty capital as the more productive input leads to increases in final goods
outputs which in turn provide more resources available for clean capital investment. Accordingly, if
the channel of indirect convertibility of capital is still open to allow clean capital accumulation, then
the reciprocal effect that emerges in the interaction between dirty and clean capital will help mitigate
stranded dirty capital assets induced by stringent pollution regulations. On the environmental side,
stringent environmental regulations by inducing accumulation of clean capital to offset the polluting
impact of dirty capital can stabilize the pollution emission trend and lead to reverse Green Paradox.
Second, while clean capital accumulation through the channel of indirect convertibility of
capital can generate reciprocal effects to encourage dirty capital investment, the effect is diminishing such that transitional dynamics will still converge to steady state in the long run without
sustained capital accumulation and environmental improvement. We hence provide an endogenous
mechanism of sustained capital accumulation. That is, if 1) preference has unitary elasticity of
substitution between consumption and the environment (demand pull), and 2) the clean capital
accumulation follows a linear process without capital conversion costs (technology push), then
the economy could escape convergence to steady state and make transitions to a balanced growth
path along which accumulation of both capital, as well as environmental improvement, can be
sustained in the long run without converging to steady state.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model of green growth
with the irreversibility of capital investment. Section 3 provides characterizations and analytical
insights into Green Paradox and stranded assets. Section 4 gives numerical examples to accompany the analytical results. Section 5 explores an endogenous mechanism of sustained capital
accumulation and environmental improvement. Section 6 concludes.

4
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1.1

Related Literature

Growth and the Environment. As this paper aims to provide insights into how the interaction
between dirty and clean capital affects the transition to green growth, it is thus closely related to
the literature on growth and the environment. The inverse U-shaped relationship between some
environmental and economic indicators are empirically examined in the so-called Environmental
Kuznets Curve (EKC) literature (e.g., Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Selden and Song, 1994; Stern
and Common, 2001; Dasputa et al., 2002). Meanwhile, a large body of theoretical studies emerges
in the literature to rationalize stylized facts related to the EKC, for example, John and Pecchenino
(1994); Selden and Song (1995); Mohtadi (1996); Stokey (1998), and more recently Andreoui and
Levinson (2001); Jones and Manuelli (2001); Cassou and Hamilton (2004); Hart (2004); Hartman
and Kwon (2005); Bartz and Kelly (2008); Brock and Taylor (2010); Smulders et al. (2011).5
The existing theoretical literature explains the EKC through the following three mechanisms:
1) pollution abatement; 2) resource use efficiency or pollution intensity improvement; and 3)
energy regime switch. As a departure from the existing mechanisms, the focus of our exposition in
this paper is on capital stock accumulation, investment irreversibility, and imperfect substitution
between clean and dirty capital. In particular, we highlight the importance of clean capital
accumulation through the channel of indirect capital convertibility to making a transition to a
greener growth outcome. We also establish a mechanism of endogenous capital accumulation
through which the economy can grow, and the environment improves in the long run. In this regard,
the analytical framework in the present paper builds on the Lucas two-sector endogenous growth
theory where the accumulation of both physical and human capital is essential for endogenous
growth (e.g., Uzawa, 1965; Lucas, 1988; Sergio, 1991; Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Caballe
and Santos, 1993; Bovenberg and Smulders, 1995; Ruiz-Tamarit, 2008). As a departure, we adopt
the Lucas endogenous model to the green growth context where the focus of our exposition is
on interactions between the environment, dirty and clean capital stocks.
As the present paper is related to endogenous growth, we also acknowledge the strand of
literature on endogenous growth and the environment. For example, the endogenous growth
mechanism in some studies focus on R&D knowledge (e.g., Bovenberg and Smulders, 1995; Barbier, 1999; Goulder and Schneider, 1999; Schou, 2002; Groth and Schou, 2007b; Grimaud and
Rouge, 2003; Tsur and Zemel, 2005; Popp, 2004; Bosetti et al., 2011), while others emphasize
5

Typically, the production technology uses physical capital as production inputs to produce final goods
which are allocated towards consumption, investment in physical capital, and pollution abatement. Pollution
discharges arise from production or consumption of final goods, and the agent receives utility from consumption
and environmental quality.

5
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variety-expanding or quality-improving endogenous/directed technical change (e.g., Bovenberg
and Smulders, 1996; Schou, 2000, 2002; Smulders and de Nooij, 2003; van Zon and Yetkiner, 2003;
di Maria and Valente, 2008; Peretto, 2009; Acemoglu et al., 2012; Bretschger and Smulders, 2012;
Jin and Zhang, 2016; Bretschger et al., 2017). Basically, in both the Lucas endogenous growth and
endogenous technical change models, the underlying mechanisms all highlight the role of spillovers
(human capital/R&D/technology spillovers) as the positive externality to offset the pollution
externality and attain endogenous growth. In contrast, our study in this paper demonstrates
an endogenous capital accumulation mechanism through which the economy can grow, and the
environment improves without the positive externality of spillover.
Stranded Assets and Green Paradox. Studies on stranded assets find that stringent environmental regulations such as a tough carbon budget for the 2◦C global warming target lead to asset
stranding for a substantial share of fossil resource reserves (e.g., Allen et al., 2009; McGlade and
Ekins, 2015; Pfeiffer et al., 2016; van der Ploeg, 2018). Meanwhile, a strand of related literature is
Green Paradox. Owners of polluting non-renewable resources reserves such as coal and oil, when
anticipating stringent environmental regulations to reduce the demand, would increase extraction
for fear of their reserves becoming worthless (stranded), thus leading to acceleration of pollution
emissions and counteracting the effect of well-intended environmental policy in the short run (e.g.,
Sinn, 2008, 2015; Smulders et al., 2012; van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2012a, 2014; van der Ploeg,
2016a). Environmental policies which entail the Green Paradox phenomenon further deteriorate
the environment and are thus suboptimal.
Previous studies on the Green Paradox and stranded assets take a supply-side approach that
focuses on suppliers of fossil fuel reserves. The more recent studies, in contrast, take a demand-side
approach that emphasizes an investor accumulating irreversible capital assets, and thus obtain
two interesting findings that differ from the previous results. First, if capital accumulation is
irreversible (i.e., the accumulated dirty capital cannot be directly used in clean sectors), then it
is optimal to stop investing into dirty capital earlier and make a shift to investment into the clean
sector to avoid later stranding of dirty capital assets. Second, it is demonstrated that investment
irreversibility on the demand side, by stopping investment in the dirty capital earlier, enhances
the effect of environmental regulations and reduces emissions in the short term, thus leading to
a reverse Green Paradox effect (Baldwin et al., 2018; van der Ploeg and Rezai, 2018).
As a departure, our work in this paper contributes to a different mechanism through which
stringent environmental regulation can reverse the Green Paradox effect with a green growth
outcome, but not necessarily leading to asset stranding of dirty capital. Specifically, we show that

6

https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1258

10

Jin and Zhang: Capital Accumulation, Green Paradox, and Stranded Assets: An

stringent environmental regulation does not necessarily lead to asset stranding of dirty capital,
if 1) investment is only subject to direct irreversibility (i.e., dirty capital itself cannot be directly
converted into clean capital) and dirty capital can be converted into clean one indirectly through
final goods mediation (i.e., dirty capital can be used to produce final goods that are allocated
toward investing clean capital), and 2) the clean capital has a pollution-saving effect to offset
polluting impacts caused by dirty one.

2
2.1

The Model
The Basic Setup

Preference. The economy admits a representative household with the size normalized to unity,
and instantaneous utility from consumption C is described by a concave function U(C) with
U 0 >0, U 00 <0, and limC→0U 0 =∞. Meanwhile, Following van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012a,b,
2014), the household also values the environment and the preference is additively separable over
consumption and the environment. Disutility from pollution P is specified by a convex function
V (P ) with V 0(P )>0, V 00(P )>0, limP →0V 0(P )=0, i.e., marginal pollution damages are strictly
increasing and approach zero when pollution levels are sufficiently low.
Production Technology. In this canonical model, we consider two stylized capital stocks - dirty
and clean capital, and both types of capital are accumulative stocks. The dirty capital is a necessary
input to produce final goods.6 The clean capital is also productive as it enables more final good
produced for a given amount of dirty capital through improving the functioning and productivity
of dirty capital (equipment maintenance effects). The production technology of final goods thus
reads: Y =F (KD ,KC ), where KD and KC are the dirty and clean capital stock, respectively. The
production function F :R2+ →
7 R+ satisfies the following conditions: FKD >0, FKC >0, FKD KD <0,
FKC KC <0, FKD KC >0. Each type of capital stock produces positive and diminishing returns, and
for an aggregate economy, the clean capital as an imperfect substitute to dirty one can help maintain
and improve efficiency and productivity in the use of dirty capital (avoid pollution-related erosion of
manufacturing equipment). The assumption of imperfect substitution between production inputs for
an aggregate economy are often documented in the literature (e.g., Tahvonen, 1997; Tahvonen and
Salo, 2001; Tsur and Zemel, 2003, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2012; van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2014).
6
Capital deployed in material-based manufacturing sectors (e.g., chemicals, mineral and energy, iron and steel,
cement, machinery, equipment, and apparatus) is necessary to produce final goods for consumption and investment.

7
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Environmental Impacts. Dirty and clean capital are characterized by different environmental
impacts: dirty capital leads to pollution emissions while clean one is pollution-saving. Following
Stokey (1998), Schou (2000, 2002) and Grimaud and Rouge (2003, 2005), polluting emission as a
by-product of using clean and dirty capital is described as: P =P (KD ,KC ), where P is treated as a
flow variable and corresponds to emissions of flow pollutants such as SO2, NOx, CO, and suspended
particulate.7 The function of pollution emissions P :R2+ →
7 R+ is assumed to have the following properties: PKD >0, PKD KD ≥0, PKC <0, PKC KC ≤0, PKD KC <0. Here pollution emissions of dirty capital are positive and convex. Clean capital can reduce pollution emissions, but the emission-saving
effect is diminishing. Clean capital serves to reduce marginal pollution emissions of dirty capital.
Capital Accumulation. Both dirty and clean capital are accumulative stocks and evolve
according to the following law of motion: K̇D = ID and K̇C = Φ(IC ), where ID and IC are the
amounts of final goods allocated towards investment in dirty and clean capital.8 Final goods are
used for spending on consumption and investment in two capital stocks, and the aggregate resource
constraint is given as Y =C +IC +ID . One unit of spending on dirty capital investment accumulates
one unit of dirty capital stock, but one unit of final goods allocated towards clean capital investment
accumulates less than one unit of clean capital, because the clean capital is different from dirty
one in characteristics and properties, and converting dirty capital into clean one is thus subject to
irreversibility (e.g., Kolstad, 1996; Ulph and Ulph, 1997; Pindyck, 1991, 2000; Fisher and Narain,
2003). If the process of converting dirty capital into clean one is irreversible, then there will
be imperfect mobility of capital assets and rising adjustment costs that cannot be recoverable.
Following Hayashi (1982), the function of clean capital investment satisfies the following properties:
Φ0(.)>0, Φ00(.)<0, Φ(0)=0, Φ0(0)=1, where the rate of clean capital accumulation is positive and
diminishing, and the adjustment costs vanish when clean capital investment is sufficiently small.
7

One could argue that pollution must be treated as a stock variable. Indeed, it appears that accumulation of carbon dioxide also requires dynamic specification. However, the fact that this can sensibly complicate calculations must
also be taken into account, as it is difficult to characterize the qualitative features of a model with three state variables
without restrictive assumptions about the functional forms. For this reason, this paper as a first step in the analysis
will treat pollution as a flow and incorporate two stock variables (dirty and clean capital stock) into the dynamic
analysis, as was done in, for example, Stokey (1998), Schou (2000, 2002) and Grimaud and Rouge (2003, 2005).
8
To facilitate the exposition, we drop the rate of capital depreciation, but this treatment will not change the
key results of the analysis for the underlying mechanism.

8
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2.2

The Canonical Problem

Green Growth with Direct Irreversibility. The model of green growth with irreversibility of
investment is described as the following problem that maximizes discounted intertemporal utility
Z
max

[C(t),ID (t),IC (t)]∞
t0

∞

e−ρt[U(C(t))−V (P (t))]dt,

(1)

0

subject to irreversibility of capital investment and aggregate resource constraints
K̇D (t)=ID (t)≥0, K̇C (t)=Φ(IC (t))≥0, IC (t)+ID (t)=F (KD (t),KC (t))−C(t),

(2)

0
given the initial conditions of both capital stocks KD (t0) = KD
and KC (t0) = KC0 . While the

growth problem is casted in a social optimum framework, characterization of the social optimum is
0

(P )
the same as that in a decentralized equilibrium by pricing pollution at a level τ = VU 0(C)
, where τ is

marginal costs of pollution, and marginal pollution damages V 0(P ) in the utility units are converted
to final goods units by dividing marginal utility of consumption U 0(C) (see Appendix C for details).
Meanwhile, as the green growth problem internalizes the pollution externality, we thus
capture the effect of clean capital on both production and households utility through the channel
of environmental preservation. Specifically, clean capital helps maintain and improve efficiency
and productivity in the use of dirty capital by avoiding pollution-related erosion of manufacturing
equipment (e.g., Schou, 2000, 2002; Groth and Schou, 2007a), and it is also straightforward to
consider that clean capital by reducing pollution emissions improves the utility of households
who value the environment (e.g., Grimaud and Rouge, 2003, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2012; van der
Ploeg and Withagen, 2014). Our model thus provides the simultaneous analysis of both effects.
Furthermore, following Baldwin et al. (2018), irreversibility of investment is described as
non-negativity constraints on capital investment, but here we distinguish capital investment
between direct and indirect irreversibility. In our model, the conditions ID ≥0 and IC ≥0 given
in (2) correspond to the direct irreversibility. That is, investment goods of dirty capital itself
cannot be disinvested and directly converted into a clean one: ID 9IC . For example, equipment,
machinery, facilities and other investment goods installed in coal-fired power plants cannot be
directly deployed in solar PV facility or windmills for clean capital buildup.
However, direct irreversibility of investment goods cannot rule out indirect convertibility
of capital. That is, while investment goods of dirty capital cannot be directly converted into
clean one, dirty capital can be used to produce final goods which in turn provide resources for
9
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investment in the clean capital: ID →KD →Y →IC . So the market mediation of final goods plays
an important role to convert dirty capital into clean one although the direct irreversibility rules
out the direct channel. For example, while equipment installed in coal-fired power plants cannot
be directly deployed in solar PV facility or windmills, the former capital can be used to produce
final goods that are further allocated towards investment in the clean capital.
As we will show later, the stringent environmental regulation does not necessarily lead to
asset stranding of dirty capital, if growth is only subject to direct irreversibility and the dirty
capital can be converted into clean one indirectly through final goods mediation. As compared
to green growth with only direct irreversibility, we also consider the following growth problem.
Green Growth with Direct and Indirect Irreversibility. With direct and indirect irreversibility of investment, the canonical problem of growth reads:
Z

∞

max

[C(t),ID (t)]∞
t
0

e−ρt[U(C(t))−V (P (t))]dt,
(3)

0

s.t. K̇D (t)=ID (t)≥0, F (KD (t),KC0 )=C(t)+ID (t),
0
given the initial conditions KD (t0)=KD
and KC (t0)=KC0 .

As compared to the case with direct irreversibility given in (1), growth with both direct and
indirect irreversibility completely rules out the possibility of clean capital accumulation. First,
there is no direct convertibility of dirty capital itself into a clean one: ID 9 IC . Second, the
channel of indirect convertibility between dirty and clean capital through final goods exchange
also vanishes, i.e., final goods produced by dirty capital cannot be allocated towards investing
clean capital: ID 9 KD 9 Y 9 IC . As a result, the possibility of clean capital accumulation is
ruled out in both direct and indirect channels, the stock of clean capital thus remains unchanged
at a certain level KC (t)=KC0 , ∀t∈[0,∞] for the growth problem.

3
3.1

Characterizations
Green Growth with Direct Irreversibility

Following the Pontryagin Maximum Principle of optimal control (Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1987;
Kamien and Schwartz, 1991), optimal allocations for the problem of maximizing (1) subject to

10
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(2) with positive amounts of clean capital investment IC >0 are characterized as follows:9
U 0(C)=λD , Φ0(IC )=

λD
, ρλD − λ̇D =λD FKD −V 0PKD , ρλC − λ̇C =λD FKC −V 0PKC ,
λC

(4)

with transversality conditions: limt→+∞e−ρtλD KD =0 and limt→+∞e−ρtλC KC =0. λD ,λC are the
shadow values corresponding to dirty and clean capital KD ,KC , respectively.
More generally, optimal investment in clean capital is determined by the complementary
slackness condition: λC Φ0(IC )≤λD , IC ≥0, (λC Φ0(IC )−λD )IC =0. That is, if the marginal benefit
of clean capital is strictly less than that of dirty one, i.e., Φ0(IC )λC <λD , then it is optimal not
to allocate final goods towards clean capital investment IC = 0 even if the channel of indirect
convertibility is still open to allow clean capital accumulation. However, given that our model
considers both capitals as accumulative stocks that will generate intertemporal benefits over the
time frame (i.e., shadow values), the social planner will take into account large intertemporal
benefits created by clean capital accumulation (mainly through mitigating pollution damages and
social costs) and thus launch clean capital investment at the very beginning.
Proposition 1. If the investment is only subject to direct irreversibility and the channel of indirect
convertibility is still open to enable clean capital accumulation, then clean capital investment can
take place at the very beginning, and the optimal growth path always evolves a positive amount
of resources allocation towards clean capital investment.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Intuitively, from (4) clean capital investment is determined by the ratio of shadow values
between dirty and clean capital:
R ∞ −ρ(t−t ) 0
0
e
(U FKD −V 0PKD )dt
λ
(t
)
D
0
t0
0
Φ (IC (t0))=
= R ∞ −ρ(t−t ) 0
.
0
0 (U F
λC (t0)
e
KC −V PKC )dt
t0

(5)

As the growth framework used in our work captures the welfare effect of capital investment through
both final goods production/consumption (the final goods channel) and pollution-induced utility
losses (the environmental channel), it is straightforward to compare welfare effect of dirty and
clean capital through the above-mentioned channels.
9

Necessary conditions of optimality are derived from the ordinary current-value Hamiltonian function:
H (C,IC ,KD ,KC ,λD ,λC )≡U(C)−V (P (KD ,KC ))+λD (F (KD ,KC )−C −IC )+λC Φ(IC ), where C,IC are control
variables, KD ,KC state variables, and λD ,λC co-state variables.
0
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Specifically, net marginal benefits of dirty capital are decreasing because marginal benefits
through the final goods channel, i.e., U 0FKD , are declining and marginal costs through the environmental channel, i.e., V 0PKD , are increasing. In contrast, net marginal benefits of clean capital could
be rising over time because both marginal benefits through the consumption channel, i.e., U 0FKC ,
and marginal costs through the environmental channel, i.e., V 0PKC , are decreasing. Put differently,
while the instantaneous marginal benefit of clean capital is smaller than that of dirty one in the short
run, the former is increasing over time (through the environmental channel) and could be larger
than the latter in the long term. Therefore, intertemporal benefits created by clean capital could
be larger than that of the dirty one, thus inducing clean capital investment at the very beginning.
With indirect convertibility to enable clean capital investment, transitional dynamics of
growth is characterized by the following system of dynamical equations:
K̇D =F (KD ,KC )−C −IC , K̇C =Φ(IC ),

(6a)

λ̇D =ρλD +V 0PKD −λD FKD , λ̇C =ρλC +V 0PKC −λD FKC ,

(6b)

where optimal levels of consumption C and clear capital investment IC are determined by the
dC
first two equations in (4) as a function of λC and λD , i.e., C =C(λD ) with C 0(λD ):= dλ
= U100 <0,
D

and IC = IC (λC ,λD ) with

∂IC
∂λD

= Φ001λC < 0,

∂IC
∂λC

= − Φλ00Dλ2 > 0. Following the works that analyze
C

transitional dynamics for a two-stock dynamical system (e.g., Dockner, 1985; Tahvonen, 1991;
Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen, 1991; Tahvonen, 1997), we can establish the saddle-path stability
of transitional dynamics by the following result.
Proposition 2. If investment is only subject to direct irreversibility and the channel of indirect
convertibility is open to enable clean capital accumulation, then transitional dynamics of growth
is saddle-path stable. Given initial conditions of dirty and clean capital [KD (t0),KC (t0)], there
is a stable saddle path that endogenously determines shadow values of dirty and clean capital
[λD (t0),λC (t0)]. Then starting with [KD (t0),KC (t0),λD (t0),λC (t0)], the economy evolves along the
∗
stable saddle path characterized by (6) and approaches steady state [KD
,KC∗ ,λ∗D ,λ∗C ].

Proof. See Appendix B.

3.2

Green Growth with Direct and Indirect Irreversibility

Optimal allocations corresponding to the green growth problem given in (3) are characterized
by U 0(C) = λD and ρλD − λ̇D = λD FKD −V 0PKD . The fist equation is static efficiency condition
12
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characterizing consumption: the marginal utility of consumption is equal to the shadow value
of dirty capital. The second Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation provides non-arbitrage
dynamic efficiency condition for dirty capital assets: the return on holding a marginal unit of dirty
capital must equal capital value appreciation/decreciation plus net instantaneous marginal benefits
(marginal benefits through consumption minus marginal costs through pollution damages).10
As direct and indirect irreversibility of investment stifles clean capital accumulation, the
stock of clean capital stock remains unchanged at a certain level KC0 . Transitional dynamics are
characterized by the dirty capital stock and corresponding shadow value [KD (t),λD (t)]∞
t=t0 that
evolves according to the following differential equations:

K̇D =F (KD ,KC0 )−C(λD ), λ̇D = ρ−FKD (KD ,KC0 ) λD +V 0(P )PKD (KD ,KC0 ),

(7)

where the optimal levels of consumption C = C(λD ) are determined by the shadow value λD ,
dC
with comparative static effects given by C 0(λD ):= dλ
= U100 <0. Transitional dynamics stability
D

is characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. For green growth with both direct and indirect irreversibility, transitional dy0
namics is saddle-path stable: given an initial stock of dirty capital KD (t0) = KD
, there is an

one-dimensional stable saddle path that uniquely determines a corresponding shadow value λD (t0).
Then starting with the initial pair [KD (t0),λD (t0)], the economy evolves along the stable saddle
∗ ∗
path characterized by (7) and approaches a unique steady state [KD
,λD ] that exists.

Proof. See Appendix D.
Given that Proposition 3 has established the existence of a steady state, the analysis will
proceed by investigating comparative static effects on the steady state. First, we consider the impact
of environmental regulations on the steady state. In our analytical framework, environmental
regulations that fully internalize the pollution externality is characterized by marginal pollution
damages V 0(P ).11 An increase in the marginal pollution damages thus corresponds to more
stringent environmental regulations. Second, as direct and indirect irreversibility of investment
disenables accumulation of clean capital, the initial endowment of clean capital available in the
10

Appendix C shows that characterization of social optimal allocations is the same as that in decentralized
0
(P )
equilibrium by pricing pollution emissions at a level τ = VU 0 (C)
.
11
As Appendix C shows, allocations in a decentralized equilibrium with environmental regulations in the form
0
(P )
of pricing pollution according to marginal pollution damages τ = VU 0 (C)
are consistent with allocations in the social
optimum where the pollution externality is fully internalized.
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economy would be a key factor. We will thus examine how changes in the initial endowment of
clean capital KC0 affect the long run steady state. The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 4. For green growth with direct and indirect irreversibility, environmental regulations
have negative effects on the steady state: more stringent environmental regulations leads to a
smaller steady state of dirty capital stocks. Meanwhile, initial endowments of clean capital have
positive effects on the steady state: a larger initial stock of clean capital leads to a larger steady
state of dirty capital stock.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Furthermore, as the saddle-path stability of transitional dynamics is established in Proposition 3, we continue to examine how environmental regulation and initial clean capital endowments affect the speed of convergence to steady state. Specifically, along the stable saddle path, the gap of the dirty capital stock at time t relative to the long-run steady state
K (t)−K ∗

∗
KD (t) − KD
shrinks exponentially as follows: e−|ξ1|t = KDD(t0)−KD∗ , where the speed of conver
 p D
gence is determined by the negative eigenvalue ξ1 = ρ− ρ2 −4det(J(KD ,λD )) /2 < 0, and

the determinant of the Jacobian matrix corresponding to the dynamical system (7) is given by:

det(J(KD ,λD )) = FKD (ρ−FKD )+ V 00PK2 D +V 0PKD KD −λD FKD KD /U 00 < 0.12 Suppose that the
steady state corresponds to a date t∗ at which transitional dynamics have finished 99% of the
initial distance, i.e.,

∗
KD (t∗ )−KD
∗
KD (t0 )−KD

=0.01, the time of convergence to the steady state along the stable

saddle path of transitional dynamics is determined as:
t∗ =

ln100
=
|ξ1|

√
ρ−

ln100

.

(8)

ρ2 −4det(J(KD ,λD ))
2

We thus obtain the following result.
Proposition 5. For growth with the direct and indirect irreversibility of investment, more stringent
environmental regulation and smaller initial endowments of the clean capital stock leads to a shorter
time of convergence to steady state along the stable saddle path of transitional dynamics.
Proof. See Appendix F.
12

The negative sign of det(J(KD ,λD )) is derived as follows: the first term is negative due to FKD > ρ from
the Euler consumption rule, and the second term is negative following from V 00 >0, PKD KD >0, FKD KD <0 and
U 00 <0. See Appendix D for details.
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Proposition 4-5 show that a larger stock of clean capital leads to both a larger steady state
of dirty capital and a shorter time of convergence to that steady state, this is primary due to
imperfect substitution and reciprocal effects between dirty and clean capital. Hence, it is crucial to
keep the channel of indirect convertibility open such that the resources available can be allocated
towards clean capital accumulation. As the clean capital as an imperfect substitute is accumulated
to a larger stock, it will generate the reciprocal effect that help improves the productivity and
market values of dirty capital which in turn encourage investment in dirty capital and hence avoid
asset stranding of dirty capital. This result thus provides a helpful supplement to the existing
studies on stranded dirty capital (Baldwin et al., 2018; van der Ploeg and Rezai, 2018).

4
4.1

Numerical Examples
Specifications and Parametrization
Table I: Summary of parameters for numerical simulation
Description
Degree of homogeneity of pollution emissions
Coefficient of clean capital conversion costs
Output elasticity of the dirty capital
Pollution elasticity of the dirty capital
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution
Coefficient of marginal pollution damage
Rate of time preference

Parameter

Value

ν
φ
α
β
θ
κ
ρ

0.8
0.01
0.8
1.2
0.5
0.012
0.06

This section provides numerical examples to support the analytical insights obtained in the previous
section. The parametrization is summarized in Table I. The utility function for consumption is
1−σ

given by U(C) = C1−σ . The coefficient of relative risk aversion is set at σ = 2 which is within
the consensus range 1-3, and σ =2 implies that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution takes
a value θ := σ1 =0.5 which is within the consensus range 0.05-1 (e.g., Mehra and Prescott, 1985;
Epstein and Zin, 1991; Acemoglu et al., 2012; van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2012b, 2014). The
rate of time preference is set at ρ=0.06 which is within the standard range. Following van der
Ploeg and Withagen (2012b, 2014), the environmental pollution damage is convex and specified
15
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2

as V (P ) = κP2 with the coefficient of marginal pollution damages κ. κ = 0.012 corresponds to
stringent environmental regulations where the pollution externality of dirty capital is internalized,
while a sufficiently small value of marginal pollution damages κ=0.00012 is set to represent lax
environmental regulations where the externality of pollution damages is not internalized.
Following Groth and Schou (2007a) and van der Ploeg and Withagen (2014), the production
α 1−α
technology is specified as a Cobb-Douglas function: Y =F (KD ,KC )=KD
KC , where the output

elasticity of dirty capital is set at α = 0.8. The relation between dirty/clean capital and the
β
environment is described by the pollution emission function: P =P (KD ,KC )=KD
KCν−β , where

the emission elasticity of dirty capital is set at β = 1.2 and the pollution-saving effect of clean
capital at ν =0.8. Following Hayashi (1982), the stock of clean capital evolves according to K̇C =
Φ(IC )=IC − 21 φIC2 with the Hayashi style adjustment costs, and this specification satisfies Φ(0)=0,
Φ0(.)>0, Φ00(.)<0 and Φ0(0)=1, i.e., converting final goods produced by dirty capital into clean
one is subject to conversion costs and the coefficient of capital conversion costs is set at φ=0.01.
With the specification mentioned above, transitional dynamics of green growth with the only
direct irreversibility of investment is characterized as follows:
K̇D
K̇C




α−1
λD
KD
2(ν−β) 2β−1
1−
, λ̇D =ρλD −α
λD +βκKC
KD ,
φ
λC
KC



2

α
λD
1
λD
KD
1
2(ν−β)−1 2β
KD ,
1−
−
1−
, λ̇C =ρλC −(1−α)
λD +(ν−β)κKC
=
φ
λC
2φ
λC
KC
1
−1
α
=KC1−αKD
−λD θ −

where the channel of indirect convertibility between dirty and clean capital is open to enable clean
capital accumulation. We use the relaxation algorithm developed by Trimborn et al. (2008) to
numerically solve the transitional dynamics. The essence of the relaxation algorithm is to replace a
system of differential equations by a system of approximate finite-difference equations on a mesh of
points in time and to solve the latter system with a Newton-type iteration process. Application of
this relaxation algorithm to economic dynamic analysis can be found in (e.g., Strulik and Trimborn,
2010; Grossmann et al., 2013; Bretschger and Schaefer, 2017; van der Meijden and Smulders,
2017). Solving the system of four dynamic equations yields four eigenvalues with two positive
and two negative [ξ1,ξ2,ξ3,ξ4]=[3.07,−3.01,0.07,−0.01]. This numerical result thus coincides with
the theoretical insights given in Proposition 2: there exists a two-dimensional stable saddle path
along which the stock and shadow value of both dirty and clean capital [KD (t),KC (t),λD (t),λC (t)]
∗
would evolve and converge to steady states [KD
,KC∗ ,λ∗D ,λ∗C ]=[293.3,3687.2,0.0453,0.0453].

In contrast, when investment is subject to both direct and indirect irreversibility that stifles
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(a) Growth with small initial clean capital

(b) Growth with large initial clean capital

Figure 1: Phase diagrams of growth with direct and indirect irreversibility of investment: (a)
growth with smaller initial clean capital endowment KC0 =1; (b) growth with larger initial clean
capital endowment KC0 = 10. The dotted red, blue and magenta line corresponds to locus of
points for stationery dirty capital stock, stationery shadow values with stringent and lax pollution
regulations, respectively. The solid and dashed black line corresponds to the stable saddle path
of growth with stringent and lax pollution regulations, respectively.
clean capital accumulation, the clean capital stock remains unchanged at a certain endowment
level KC0 . In this case, transitional dynamics of growth is described as:
K̇D (t)=KD (t)αKC0

1−α



1
1−α
2(ν−β)
−λD (t)− θ , λ̇D (t)= ρ−αKD (t)α−1KC0
λD (t)+βκKD (t)2β−1KC0
.

Solving the two dynamic equations obtains two eigenvalues with one positive and one negative
[ξ1,ξ2]=[1.1796,−1.1196]. This numerical result is consistent with Proposition 3 which establishes
a one-dimensional stable saddle path along which the stock and shadow value of dirty capital
∗ ∗
evolves and converges to steady state [KD
,λD ]=[7.0286,0.4584].

4.2

Numerical Results

Direct and Indirect Irreversibility. When investment is subject to both direct and indirect
irreversibility, the channels of clean capital accumulation vanish, and only the initial endowment
of clean capital is available for use. For small and large initial endowments (exogenously given)
of clean capital, the corresponding transitional dynamics of growth as characterized by the stock
and shadow value of dirty capital are numerically illustrated in Figure 1a-1b, respectively.
Three features are worth noting in Figure 1. First, numerical simulation shows a stable saddle
17
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path that endogenously determines an initial shadow value, given the initial dirty capital. Starting
from the initial condition, the pair of dirty capital stock and shadow value will evolve along the
stable saddle path and converge to a steady state. It coincides with the analytical one obtained
in Proposition 3. Second, the dashed black line (growth with lax pollution regulations) lies above
the solid black one (growth with stringent regulations), suggesting that stringent regulations on
pollution lead to both a smaller amount of dirty capital along the transitional dynamic path and
a shorter time of convergence towards the steady state. This result is in line with the analytical
one obtained in Proposition 4 and 5. Third, comparing the solid black lines between Figure 1a
and Figure 1b shows that a larger initial stock of clean capital leads to a larger steady state of
the dirty capital, which is also consistent with the analytical insights given in Proposition 4-5.
Indirect Convertibility and Clean Capital Accumulation. As shown in Figure 2a where
the solid red line lies above the dashed blue one, clean capital, once the channel of indirect
convertibility of capital is open to allow investment, can create a larger shadow value as compared
to dirty one, The larger shadow value created by clean capital is mainly due to welfare gains from
mitigating emissions and pollution damages.
Accordingly, when stringent pollution regulations are put in place, clean capital will create a
shadow value premium vis-à-vis dirty one, it is thus optimal to direct resources available for investment away from dirty capital towards clean one, as demonstrated in Figure 2b where the solid red
line (clean capital investment) is well above the dashed blue line (dirty capital investment). With
more resources allocated towards the clean capital, its accumulative stock is augmented at a larger
rate and reaches a higher level of the steady state, as shown in Figure 2c where the solid red line with
a steeper curve lies well above the dashed blue line. The result regarding directed capital accumulation in this paper provides a helpful supplement to the literature related to directed technical change
and the environment, which shows that environmental regulations such as putting a price on dirty
inputs can redirect innovation towards clean inputs for achieving sustainable growth (e.g., Grimaud
and Rouge, 2008; Grimaud et al., 2011; Acemoglu et al., 2012, 2014; André and Smulders, 2014).
Clean Capital Accumulation and Dirty Capital Stranding. If the investment is subject
to both direct and indirect irreversibility, then the channel of clean capital accumulation vanishes
and growth is only driven by dirty capital accumulation. In this case, stringent environmental
regulations that correct for the externality of pollution caused by dirty capital would lead to the
significant stranding of dirty capital (e.g., Allen et al., 2009; McGlade and Ekins, 2015; van der
Ploeg, 2018). This is manifested by comparing dashed blue and dotted black lines in Figure 3,
where both the growth rate and absolute level of dirty capital are substantially reduced when
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(a) Shadow values

(b) Capital investment

(c) Capital stock

(d) Phase diagram

Figure 2: Growth with direct irreversibility of investment: (a) the shadow value of capital; (b)
capital investment; (c) the stock of capital; (d) the phase diagram of transitional dynamics. The
solid red and dashed blue line corresponds to clean and dirty capital, respectively.
stringent environmental regulations are imposed.
In contrast, if the investment is only subject to direct irreversibility, then it is optimal to
allocate resources towards clean capital investment through the channel of indirect convertibility
of capital. Due to imperfect substitution between dirty and clean capital as the case in Gerlagh
(2011), Long (2014) and van der Meijden (2014), investment in clean capital does not necessarily
crowd out resources allocated towards dirty capital investment but stimulate further accumulation
of dirty capital to a larger stock. This is demonstrated in Figure 3 where the solid red line lies
well above the dashed blue one, suggesting that the dirty capital, when interacting clean capital
as an imperfect substitute, could generate a stronger growth trend even if stringent environmental
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Figure 3: The time path of dirty capital stocks. The dashed blue and dotted black line corresponds
to growth with direct and indirect irreversibility when pollution regulations are lax and stringent,
respectively. The solid red line refers to the growth path when the economy is subject to the
direct irreversibility of investment and stringent environmental regulation.
regulations put a constraint on dirty capital.
The underlying reason for this result is that clean capital as an imperfect substitute creates a
beneficial effect that protects and increases social values of the dirty capital, which in turn encourages the further accumulation of dirty capital. In particular, the beneficial effect emanates from the
two following sources. First, clean capital helps increase the productivity of dirty capital to produce
final goods for consumption (through equipment maintenance effects). Second, clean capital has a
direct effect to reduce pollution damages caused by dirty capital and increase utility gains from the
environmental channel.13 Therefore, as keeping on accumulating dirty capital leads to diminishing
return at the margin, it is optimal to allocate resources towards clean capital, if the channel of
accumulation is open, to create the beneficial effect that increases social benefits of dirty one,
which in turn boosts further accumulation of dirty capital and helps mitigate stranded dirty assets.
Reverse Green Paradox and Growth Effect. When investment is subject to both direct and
indirect irreversibility, the channel of clean capital accumulation vanishes. In this case, the market,
when anticipating stringent pollution regulations, tends to invest less in the polluting dirty capital.
R∞
According to the shadow value of dirty capital given as λD (t) = t e−ρ(s−t) (U 0FKD −V 0PKD )ds, the two
sources of beneficial effects correspond to the first U 0FKD (the final goods channel) and second term V 0PKD (the
environmental channel) in the integrand.
13
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As a result, pollution regulations by putting stringent constraints on the use of dirty capital can
reduce pollution emissions levels (i.e., the dotted black line lies below the dashed blue one in Figure
4a. The environmental benefit gains, however, are at the cost of production output reduction and
negative growth effects (i.e., the dotted black line lies below the dashed blue line in Figure 4b.
By comparison, if the channel of indirect convertibility of capital is open to allow clean capital
accumulation, then the market, when anticipating stringent pollution regulations, tends to invest
less in the dirty capital and more in clean. Accumulation of the clean capital with pollution-saving
effects will offset the polluting impacts of dirty capital, thus stabilizing the emission trend and
reversing the Green Paradox (i.e., the solid red line is well below the dashed blue one in Figure
4a. The reverse Green Paradox effect through the accumulation of clean capital as an imperfect
substitute to dirty capital thus contributes to the existing literature on Green Paradox (e.g.,
Gerlagh, 2011; van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2012a, 2014; Long, 2014; van der Meijden, 2014;
Baldwin et al., 2018; van der Ploeg and Rezai, 2018).
Furthermore, the above-mentioned reciprocal effect matters. On the one hand, the accumulation of clean capital by increasing the market values of dirty capital can encourage the further
accumulation of dirty capital. On the other hand, dirty capital accumulation leads to increases
in production outputs which in turn provide more resources available for clean capital investment.
Accordingly, as shown in Figure 4b where the solid red line is well above the dashed blue one,
accumulation of both dirty and clean capital helps mitigate the negative growth effect caused by
stringent pollution regulations.
The existing results on environmental regulation and stranded asset demonstrate that environmental regulations by changing the costs/values of dirty inputs (fossil fuels) relative to clean
ones (renewable backstops) leads to replacements of dirty inputs by clean one (due to perfect
substitutions) and thus substantial stranding of dirty assets (e.g., van der Ploeg and Withagen,
2012a, 2014; Baldwin et al., 2018; van der Ploeg and Rezai, 2018). As a complement to the existing
mechanism, we show in this paper that if both dirty and clean capital are imperfect substitute and
their interaction can generate the above-mentioned reciprocal effect, then stringent environmental
regulation, through inducing clean capital accumulation to offset the polluting impact of dirty
one, does not necessarily leads to asset stranding of dirty capital.
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(a) Pollution emissions

(b) Production outputs

Figure 4: The time paths of (a) pollution emissions and (b) production outputs. The dashed
blue and dotted black line refers to growth with direct and indirect irreversibility when pollution
regulations are lax and stringent, respectively. The solid red corresponds to growth is only subject
to direct irreversibility of investment and pollution regulations are stringent.

5

Sustained Capital Accumulation

In the previous section, we have shown that stringent pollution regulation does not necessarily
lead to asset stranding of dirty capital if the channel of indirect convertibility of capital is still open
to enable accumulation of clean capital which generates the above-mentioned reciprocal effect to
boost dirty capital accumulation. While helping accumulate both capitals to larger stocks in the
short run, the reciprocal effect is diminishing such that transitional dynamics will still converge
to steady state in the long term without sustained capital accumulation. This section thus serves
as an extension to the previous analysis by providing an endogenous mechanism through which
capital accumulation can be sustained in the long run without converging to a steady state.

5.1

Definition and Assumptions

Green growth with only direct irreversibility of investment (i.e., the channel of indirect convertibility
of capital exists is open to allow clean capital accumulation) given in Section 3.1 is used as the
benchmark non-sustained growth case where capital accumulation converges to steady state in
the long run. To compare, we define the sustained growth as follows:
Definition 1. The sustained growth path is an equilibrium path along which consumption C, dirty
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capital KD , and clean capital KC grow at a sustained positive rate, i.e.,
K̇C
k̇
=g− ,
KC
k

K̇D
:=g,
KD

Ċ
ċ
=g+ ,
C
c

(9)

where g is defined as the rate of sustained capital accumulation, and
c:=

C
,
KD

k :=

KD
,
KC

(10)

are defined as the consumption-dirty capital ratio and dirty-clean capital ratio, respectively.14
The sustained growth path is characterized by the triple [g,c,k] defined above. To proceed
with characterization of [g,c,k], we aim to incorporate restrictive assumptions/conditions on
characterizations of the non-sustained growth given in (4), and express them by the triple [g,c,k]
that characterizes the sustained growth path. Specifically, we introduce the following assumptions:
Assumption 1. F (ψKD ,ψKC )=ψF (KD ,KC ), P (ψKD ,ψKC )=ψν P (KD ,KC ) ∀ψ ∈R+.
Here the production technology is linearly homogenous with respect to KD and KC (doubling
both capital inputs doubles final goods outputs). The pollution emission function is homogenous of degree ν in KD and KC , where ν < 1 measures the pollution-saving effect of clean
capital (the smaller the value of ν, the stronger the pollution-saving effect of clean capital to
offset the polluting effect of dirty one). From Assumption 1, it is straightforward to define
the functions: f(k) := F (KD /KC ,1) = F (k,1) and p(k) := P (KD /KC ,1) = P (k,1), where the
are determined as:
intensive variable k := KD /KC is the input argument, and the derivatives
 ν−1
PKD (KD ,KC ).
f 0(k)=FKD (KD /KC ,1)=FKD (KD ,KC ), and p0(k)=PKD (KD /KC ,1)= K1C
Assumption 2. The utility function has a unitary elasticity of substitution between consumption
and the environment, i.e., the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and pollution
is proportional to the quantity ratio:

15

∂log(U 0(C)/V 0(P ))
=−1
∂log(C/P )

⇔

U 0(C) P
= .
V 0(P ) C

(11)

As compared to the non-sustained growth case which assumes convex environmental damages
for long-lasting climate pollutants such as CO2, the Assumption 2 for sustained growth still allows
14
15

Taking logarithm of (10)
with respect to time t yields the last two expressions of (9).
 0 and differentiating

U (C)
P
Integrating yields log V 0 (P ) = log C +ω where ω is a constant. Taking exponential values on both sides

yields

U 0 (C)
P
V 0 (P ) =φ C

with φ≡eω , and for simplicity φ is normalized to unity.
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the environmental externality, but pollution damages should be concave and bounded in the
long run for short-lived environmental pollutants such as SO2, NOx and suspended particulate
matters (e.g., Lieb, 2004). This assumption on the preference side serves to generate sustained
demands for and accumulation of the dirty capital which favors final goods production but harms
the environment (see Appendix G for details).
Assumption 3. Clean capital accumulation follows a linear process without capital conversion
costs as follows:
K̇C =Φ(IC )=IC .

(12)

Final goods allocated to clean capital investment are fully converted into clean capital goods.
Without any capital conversion costs, this condition imposed on the technology side serves to ensure
efficient uses of resources (final goods productions net of consumption) available for sustained
investment in both dirty and clean capital.

5.2

Characterizations

Incorporating Assumption 1, 2, and 3 into characterization of the non-sustained growth given in
(4), we can determine the triple [g,c,k] that characterizes the sustained growth path as follows.
Proposition 6. When the conditions given in Assumption 1-3 is introduced, the economy can
evolve along a sustained growth path that is characterized by the rate of sustained capital accuD
D
, consumption-dirty capital ratio c := KCD , and dirty-clean capital ratio k := K
.
mulation g := K̇
KD
KC

The triple [g,c,k] is determined by the following three equations:


ċ
p0(k)
0
=θ f (k)−ρ−ck
−g,
c
p(k)

(13a)

k̇
=(1+k)g−f(k)+ck,
k


(13b)


p0(k)
ck ν−(1+k)
=f(k)−(1+k)f 0(k),
p(k)

(13c)

where f(k):=F (k,1), p(k):=P (k,1), f 0(k)=FKD (k,1) and p0(k)=PKD (k,1), θ is the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, ρ the rate of time preference, and ν the degree of homogeneity of the
pollution emission function.
Proof. See Appendix G.
24
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In Proposition 6, (13a), (13b) and (13c) is equivalent to the intensive form of the Euler
consumption rule, the law of motion of clean capital, and the non-arbitrage condition between
dirty and clean capital investment, respectively.16 The system of three equations given in (13)
thus determines the triple [g,c,k] that characterizes the sustained growth path.
In particular, the static equation (13c) determines the value of the pair [c,k] that can support
endogenous growth. The corresponding dynamic equivalence of (13c) determines the elasticity
of c with respect to k as follows (see Appendix G):
p0 (k)

p(k)p00 (k)−p0 (k)2

ċ/c (1+k)(kf 00(k)−f 0(k))+f(k) k p(k) +k(1+k)
p(k)2
φ(k):=
=
−
0 (k)
p
0
(1+k)f (k)−f(k)
k̇/k
(1+k) p(k) −ν

,

(14)

where φ(k) is a function of k. Substituting (13a)-(13b) into ċc =φ(k) k̇k and rearranging determines
the rate of sustained capital accumulation g as follows:




(1+k)f 0 (k)−f(k)
(1+k)f 0 (k)−f(k) p0 (k)
0
θ f (k)−ρ+
+φ(k) f(k)−
p0 (k)
p0 (k)
p(k)
g(k)=

(1+k) p(k) −ν

(1+k) p(k) −ν

1+φ(k)(1+k)

,

(15)

where φ(k) is given by (14) and the rate of capital accumulation g(k) is given as a function of k.
Given that g(k) is a function of k, transitional dynamics along the sustained growth path
is characterized by the following autonomous differential equation of k:
k̇
(1+k)f 0(k)−f(k)
=(1+k)g(k)−f(k)+
,
0
k
(1+k) p (k) −ν

(16)

p(k)

and will converge to a balanced growth path (BGP) in the long run, which is defined as follows:
Definition 2. The balanced growth path (BGP) is an equilibrium path in which consumption,
dirty and clean capital stocks grow at the same constant rate and remain constant ratios, i.e.,
Ċ K˙D K˙C
=
=
=g∗,
C KD KC

C
=c∗,
KD

KD
=k∗,
KC

(17)

where g∗ is the balanced rate of capital accumulation, c∗ the balanced ratio between consumption
Rearranging equalization of instantaneous marginal benefits between dirty and clean capital, i.e., U 0FKD −
0
V PKD =U 0FKC −V 0PKC yields FKC −FKD = VU 0 (PKC −PKD ), implying that difference in marginal welfare gain
between dirty and clean capital
h through0 thei channel of final goods is equal to that through the environmental channel,
(k)
V0
i.e., U 0 (PKC − PKD ) = ck ν−(1+k) pp(k)
and FKC − FKD = f(k) − (1 + k)f 0(k). The equalization of marginal
benefits at each instantaneous time point translates into equalization of shadow values between dirty and clean capital.
16

0
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and dirty capital, and k∗ the balanced ratio between dirty and clean capital.
The triple [g∗,c∗,k∗] that gives characterization of the BGP is determined by the following
proposition.
Proposition 7. In the balanced growth path, the dirty-clean capital ratio k∗ is endogenously
determined by the following implicit function:
0

∗

(k )
1−θ(1+k∗) pp(k
∗)
0

∗

(k )
ν−(1+k∗) pp(k
∗)

f(k∗)−θ(1+k∗)(f 0(k∗)−ρ)
=
.
f(k∗)−(1+k∗)f 0(k∗)

(18)

Given k∗, the balanced ratio between consumption and clean capital c∗ and the rate of balanced
capital accumulation g∗ are given by
c∗ =

f(k∗)−(1+k∗)f 0(k∗)
0

∗

(k )
νk∗ −k∗(1+k∗) pp(k
∗)

"

!
#
∗
∗ 0 ∗
0 ∗
f(k
)−(1+k
)f
(k
)
p
(k
)
, g∗ =θ f 0(k∗)−ρ−
.
0 ∗
p(k∗)
ν−(1+k∗) p (k∗ )

(19)

p(k )



0 (k∗ )
Proof. Imposing the stationery conditions on (13a)-(13b), we have g∗ =θ f 0(k∗)−ρ−c∗k∗ pp(k
∗)
and g∗ =(f(k∗)−c∗k∗)/(1+k∗). Cancelling the common term g∗ and rearranging yields,


0 ∗
∗ p (k )
1−θ(1+k )
c∗k∗ =f(k∗)−θ(1+k∗)(f 0(k∗)−ρ),
p(k∗)

(20)

and using (13c) to replace ck in (20) yields (18).

5.3

Numerical Examples

This subsection provides numerical examples to show the mechanism of sustained capital accumulation. Specific functions are given to satisfy the Assumption 1-3. First, following Groth and Schou
(2007a) and van der Ploeg and Withagen (2014), we consider a Cobb-Douglas production function
α 1−α
that is linearly homogeneous: F (KD ,KC ) = KD
KC , and the pollution emission function is
β
D
homogenous of degree ν: P (KD ,KC )=KD
KCν−β , we have f(k)=kα and p(k)=kβ where k := K
.
KC

Second, following Cassou and Hamilton (2004), Grimaud and Rouge (2008) and Golosov et al.
(2012), we specify a logarithmic utility function such that

U 0 (C)
P
=C
.
V 0 (P )

Third, clean capital accumu-

lation follows a linear process K̇C =IC , implying that there are no Hayashi style adjustment costs
(Hayashi, 1982). The parameterization for numerical simulation is based on Table I. To ensure that
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the pollution-saving effect of clean capital neutralizes the polluting effect of dirty one, the value of
ν (the degree of homogeneity of pollution emissions) is set at a sufficiently small level ν =0.0001.
Given the above-specified functional forms and parameterization, the ratio between dirty and
clean capital k∗ in the BGP is determined by (18):
1−(1+k∗) kβ∗
ν−(1+k∗) kβ∗

=

k∗α −(1+k∗)(αk∗α−1 −ρ)
k∗α −(1+k∗)αk∗α−1

⇒

k∗ =0.058.

(21)

Given k∗ = 0.058, the ratio between consumption and dirty capital c∗ and the rate of capital
accumulation g∗ in the BGP are given as follows:
c∗ =

k∗α −(1+k∗)αk∗α−1
k∗α −(1+k∗)αk∗α−1 β
∗
∗ α−1
=1.099,
g
=αk
−ρ−
=0.037.
k∗
νk∗ −k∗(1+k∗) kβ∗
ν−(1+k∗) kβ∗

(22)

Furthermore, we examine the stability of transitional dynamics around the BGP. Taking a
derivative of k̇/k given in (16) with respect to k and evaluating at the BGP k∗ yields:
 
d k̇/k
dk
k=k∗

d
(1+k)f 0(k)−f(k)
=
(1+k)g(k)−f(k)+
0 (k)
dk
(1+k) pp(k)
−ν

!
=−5.33,

(23)

k=k∗

where the negative value suggests asymptotic stability of transitional dynamics along the sustained
growth path towards the BGP. In particular, the absolute value of the derivative given in (23)
is sufficiently larger than the BGP value k∗ = 0.058, suggesting that the speed of convergence
along the sustained growth path towards the BGP is sufficiently fast and the phase of transitional
dynamics is sufficiently short (i.e., any deviation from the BGP k∗ will quickly return to k∗).
As shown in Figure 5a, both dirty (blue dashed line) and clean (red dashed line) capital
evolve along the non-sustained growth path and converge to their corresponding steady long-run
∗
states [KD
,KC∗ ] = [293,3687]. By comparison, when the sustained growth mechanism given in

Proposition 6 is incorporated, the economy can escape convergence to the non-sustained steady
state and make transitions to the BGP along which accumulation of both dirty and clean capital
can be sustained at a rate of 3.7% in the long run.
Meanwhile, making a transition to the BGP pattern also requires establishing a balanced ratio
between dirty and clean capital: k :=KD /KC =0.058. Given that both dirty and clean capital will
∗
be accumulated along the non-sustained growth path to the steady state [KD
,KC∗ ]=[293,3687],

making a transition to the BGP requires downward adjustments of the dirty capital by an amount
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(a) Capital stock

(b) Capital investment

(c) Pollution emissions

(d) Production outputs

Figure 5: Transition from non-sustained to sustained growth paths: (a) the stocks of clean and dirty
capital; (b) investment in clean and dirty capital; (c) pollution emission levels; (d) production output
levels. The dashed and solid lines corresponds to the non-sustained and sustained growth path.
of 80 (from the steady state level of 293 to the BGP level of 213), such that the balanced ratio
between dirty and clean capital can be established: k :=KD /KC =213/3687=0.058.
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 5b, along the non-sustained growth path, the amount of
resources allocated towards capital investment will shrink in the long run (the dashed line), and the
corresponding capital stock thus tends to approach the steady state. In contrast, if the mechanism
of sustained capital accumulation is incorporated, then the amount of resources allocated towards
capital investment will be in a rising trend (the solid lines) to enable sustained accumulation of
both dirty and clean capital at a rate of 3.7%.
While sustained accumulation of dirty capital leads to further increases in pollution emis28
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sions, accumulation of the pollution-saving clean capital that occurs simultaneously can offset
and neutralize the polluting impact of dirty one. As a result, making a transition to BGP is
characterized by a sharp decline in pollution emission levels as shown by the solid blue line in
Figure 5c. Meanwhile, the pollution emission trend is stabilized without further increases, primarily
due to the pollution-saving effect of clean capital that decouples pollution emissions from dirty
capital accumulation.17 This result thus contribute to the recent literature on building clean capital
assets such as carbon capture and storage (CSS) facilities and solar geoengineering technologies
that can break the link between dirty capital (fossil fuel power plants) and pollution damages
(climate change) (e.g., Anderson and Newell, 2004; van der Zwaan and Gerlagh, 2009; Herzog,
2011; Moreno-Cruz, 2015, 2013; Moreno-Cruz et al., 2017).
Finally, as shown in Figure 5d, growing along the non-sustained path, production outputs
will evolve along the dashed line and converge to the corresponding steady state. In contrast, the
economy, when making a transition to the BGP, will firstly experience certain output reductions
due to downward adjustment of dirty capital as shown in Figure 5a, and then gain sustained
growth momentum at a rate of 3.7% due to sustained accumulation of both dirty and clean capital
along the BGP.18 This result provides a useful complement to the literature on endogenous growth
and the environment (e.g., Bovenberg and Smulders, 1995, 1996; Schou, 2000, 2002; Groth and
Schou, 2007a; Bretschger and Smulders, 2012; Bretschger et al., 2017). As a departure from the
existing studies showing endogenous growth through positive externality such as learning by doing
and spillovers (e.g., Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990), our study in this paper demonstrates that capital
accumulation and economic growth can be sustained through an endogenous growth mechanism
that is free of the positive externality.

6

Conclusion

This paper aims to address a critical question: does stringent environmental regulation necessarily
lead to Green Paradox and asset stranding of dirty capital? We answer this question based on the
two-sector Lucas endogenous growth model with irreversible investment and imperfect substitution
between dirty and clean capital.
β
ν−β
From the pollution emission function given as P (KD ,KC )=KD
KC
, taking logarithm and differentiating
K̇D
K̇C
Ṗ
∗
−6
with respect to time t yields P = β KD +(ν −β) KC = νg = 3.7∗10 , where ν = 0.0001 and the balanced rate
of capital accumulation is g∗ =3.7%.
18
α 1−α
From the production function given as F (KD ,KC ) = KD
KC , taking logarithm and differentiating with
K̇D
K̇C
Ẏ
∗
respect to time t yields Y =α KD +(1−α) KC =g =3.7%, where g∗ =3.7%.
17
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First, if capital investment is subject to both direct and indirect irreversibility, then the
accumulation of clean capital and its effect on protecting the economic values of dirty capital
would vanish. In this case, stringent environmental regulations that correct for pollution damages
will lead to asset stranding of dirty capital. In contrast, if the investment is only subject to
direct irreversibility (i.e., dirty capital goods itself cannot be directly converted into clean ones),
then the channel of indirect convertibility still exists through which dirty capital can be used to
produce final goods which are in turn allocated towards clean capital investment. In this case,
accumulation of the clean capital can create a shadow value premium vis-à-vis dirty one, and it
is thus optimal to direct resources available for investment away from dirty capital towards clean
one and accumulate both capital stocks simultaneously.
It, in turn, generates reciprocal effects. On the one hand, accumulation of dirty capital as an
imperfect substitute can increase productivity and economic values of dirty one (through equipment
maintenance effects) and thus encourage the further accumulation of dirty capital. On the other
hand, accumulation of dirty capital as the more productive input leads to increases in final goods
outputs which in turn provide more resources available for clean capital investment. Accordingly, if
the channel of indirect convertibility of capital is still open to allow clean capital accumulation, then
the reciprocal effect that emerges in the interaction between dirty and clean capital will help mitigate
stranded dirty capital assets induced by stringent pollution regulations. On the environmental side,
stringent environmental regulations by inducing accumulation of clean capital to offset the polluting
impact of dirty capital can stabilize the pollution emission trend and lead to reverse Green Paradox.
Second, while clean capital accumulation through the channel of indirect convertibility of
capital can generate reciprocal effects to encourage dirty capital investment, the effect is diminishing such that transitional dynamics will still converge to steady state in the long run without
sustained capital accumulation and environmental improvement. We hence provide an endogenous
mechanism of sustained capital accumulation. That is, if 1) preference has unitary elasticity of
substitution between consumption and the environment (demand pull), and 2) the clean capital
accumulation follows a linear process without capital conversion costs (technology push), then
the economy could escape convergence to steady state and make transitions to a balanced growth
path along which accumulation of both capital, as well as environmental improvement, can be
sustained in the long run without converging to steady state.
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Appendix A

Proof of Proposition 1

Establishing the existence of a time point to launch clean capital investment, say tC , is equivalent
to verifying that it is impossible not to launch clean capital investment over the entire time frame.
We prove it by contradiction. Suppose there is no investment in clear capital over the entire time
frame, i.e., λD (t)−Φ0(IC (t))λC (t)>0 with IC (t)=0 ∀t∈[t0,∞) always holds. This is equivalent to
∞

Z

e−ρ(s−t)[U 0(s)(FKD (s)−FKC (s))−V 0(s)(PKD (s)−PKC (s))]ds>0,

(A.1)

t

where Φ0(IC (t))=Φ0(0)=1 with IC (t)=0 for ∀t∈[t0,∞). To find the contradiction, we consider
the steady state, say t∗, and (A.1) boils down to
1 0 ∗
[U (t )(FKD (t∗)−FKC (t∗))−V 0(t∗)(PKD (t∗)−PKC (t∗))]>0.
ρ

(A.2)

U 0 is bounded due to the concavity of utility from consumption. FKD (t∗)−FKC (t∗)<FKD (t0)−
FKC (t0) holds because FKD − FKC is decreasing in KD and KD increases as the time evolves.
Meanwhile, V 0 is sufficiently large due to the convexity of pollution damages and PKD −PKC >0
with PKD > 0, PKC < 0, and Φ0 > 0. Therefore, the LHS of (A.2) has a negative sign which
contradicts with the positive sign given in (A.2).
Evaluating (A.1) at the initial time point t0 yields:
Z

∞

e−ρ(t−t0)(U 0(t)(FKD (t)−FKC (t))−V 0(t)(PKD (t)−PKC (t)))dt<0.

(A.3)

t0

Define ∆(t):=U 0(t)(FKD (t)−FKC (t))−V 0(t)(PKD (t)−PKC (t)), we verify that ∆(t) is decreasing
in time t∈[t0,∞], with the largest values of ∆(t) taken at t0. Therefore, we can choose the level of
endogenous control variable C such that the marginal utility of consumption is sufficiently small
U 0 ↓ and ∆(t0):=U 0(t0)(FKD (t0)−FKC (t0))−V 0(t0)(PKD (t0)−PKC (t0))≤0. Then (A.3) will hold.
0
In particular, given initial conditions of dirty and clean capital stocks KD (t0) = KD
and

KC (t0)=KC0 , if the initial level of consumption is chosen to satisfy
U 0(C(t0))≤

0
0
0
V 0(P (KD
,KC0 ))(PKD (KD
,KC0 )−PKC (KD
,KC0 ))
,
0
0
FKD (KD
,KC0 )−FKC (KD
,KC0 )

(A.4)

then clean capital investment can take place at the initial time point t0.
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Appendix B

Proof of Proposition 2

Stability of transitional dynamics of growth with clean capital accumulation is characterized by
a 4×4 Jacobian matrix as follows:




λD
1
1
FK FKC − U 00 + Φ00λC
2
Φ00 λC
 D

0
0
 0
Φ λD 
Φ
0
−

2
00
00
Φ λC
Φ λC ,
J(KD ,KC ,λD ,λC )= 

 ∂λ̇D ∂λ̇D

ρ−F
0
K
D
 ∂KD ∂KC

∂ λ̇C
∂ λ̇C
−FKC
ρ
∂KD
∂KC
∂ λ̇D
∂ λ̇C
= V 00PK2 D +V 0PKD KD −λD FKD KD > 0, ∂K
∂KD
C
∂ λ̇C
00
0
= ∂K
=V
P
P
+V
P
−λ
F
<0.
K
K
K
K
D
K
K
D
C
D C
D C
D

where
∂ λ̇D
∂KC

(B.1)

= V 00PK2 C +V 0PKC KC −λD FKC KC > 0, and

The characteristic polynomial of the 4×4 Jacobian matrix takes a form as:
det(ψI −J)=ψ4 −tr(J)ψ3 +tr(Λ2J)ψ2 −tr(Λ3J)ψ+detJ =0,

(B.2)

where ψ is the eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix J, and I is a 4×4 identity matrix. tr(ΛnJ) is the
trace of the nth exterior power of the Jacobian matrix J and is equal to the sum of all principal
minors of J with order n = 1,2,3,4. tr(Λ0J) = 1, tr(Λ1J) = 2ρ, tr(Λ4J) = detJ, and tr(Λ2J) and
tr(Λ3J) are equal to the sum of all principal minors of J with order two and three, respectively.
Based on the results given in Tahvonen (1997), the sum of all principal minors of J with order
two tr(Λ2J) and three tr(Λ3J) has the following relation:
tr(Λ3J)
=tr(Λ2J)−ρ2 =Ω1 +Ω2 +2Ω3.
ρ

(B.3)

Substituting (B.3) into (B.2), the 4×4 Jacobian matrix J can be rewritten as:
det(ψI −J)=ψ4 −2ρψ3 +(ρ2 +Ω)ψ2 −ρΩψ+detJ =0,

(B.4)

where Ω≡Ω1 +Ω2 +2Ω3. From (B.4) we obtain the following four eigenvalues:
ρ
ψ1,2,3,4 = ±
2

r 
ρ 2 Ω 1p 2
− ±
Ω −4detJ(KD ,KC ,λD ,λC ),
2
2 2

(B.5)

where detJ(KD ,KC ,λD ,λC ) is the determinant of the Jacobian matrix corresponding to the
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dynamical system (6), and Ω=Ω1 +Ω2 +Ω3 +Ω4 with
Ω1 =

∂ K̇D
∂KD
∂ λ̇D
∂KD

∂ K̇D
∂λD
∂ λ̇D
∂λD

, Ω2 =

∂ K̇C
∂KC
∂ λ̇C
∂KC

∂ K̇C
∂λC
∂ λ̇C
∂λC

, Ω3 =

∂ K̇D
∂KC
∂ λ̇D
∂KC

∂ K̇D
∂λC
∂ λ̇D
∂λC

, Ω4 =

∂ K̇C
∂KD
∂ λ̇C
∂KD

∂ K̇C
∂λD
∂ λ̇D
∂λC

.

Ω1 and Ω2 determine the stability of the
 dynamical
 system with KD and λD and that with
1
1
KC and λC : Ω1 = FKD (ρ − FKD ) + U 00 + Φ00λC V 00PK2 D +V 0PKD KD −λD FKD KD < 0, and

0
Ω2 = ΦΦ00λλD2 V 00PK2 C +V 0PKC KC −λD FKC KC < 0. Ω3 and Ω4 determine the stability of inC

teraction between the two capital: Ω3 =
0

−λD
2
Φ00 λC

(V 00PKD PKC +V 0PKD KC −λD FKD KC ) < 0, and

00
0
Ω4 = Φ−Φ
00 λ (V PKD PKC +V PKD KC −λD FKD KC )<0, and verify that Ω3 =Ω4 .
C

2
The case where the four eigenvalues are real-valued requires Ω2 − 4detJ ≥ 0 and ρ2 −
√
Ω
± 12 Ω2 −4detJ ≥0. To generate two-dimensional saddle-path stability (i.e., the four eigenval2
ues are all real-valued with two positive and two negative), we should establish the condition
√
2
± 12 Ω2 −4detJ ≥ Ω2 , and this is equivalent to Ω < 0 and 14 (Ω2 − 4detJ) < Ω2 ⇒ detJ > 0.
Q
Furthermore, if detJ < 0, then we have 4i=1 ψi = detJ < 0, i.e., there is one eigenvalue to be
negative, establishing one-dimensional stable manifold. Putting together the two cases Ω<0 and
detJ > 0: a two-dimensional saddle-path stability, and Ω < 0 and detJ < 0: an one-dimensional
stable manifold), transitional dynamics are stable if Ω<0.

Appendix C

Characterizations of the Equilibrium

With direct irreversibility of investment, the problem of the representative household reads:
Z
max ∞

[C(t),IC (t)]t=0

∞

e−ρtU(C(t))dt
(C.1)

0

s.t. K̇D (t)=π(t)+rD (t)KD (t)−C(t)−IC (t), K̇C (t)=Φ(IC (t))+rC (t)KC (t).
The representative household owns dirty and clean capital stock KD and KC and receives remunerations by renting capital at the rate of return given by rD and rC , respectively. The household
also has an ownership of a representative firm using dirty and clean capital to produce final goods
and receives profits π. Solving the household problem yields characterizations: U 0(C) = λD for
consumption, λD =Φ0(IC )λC for clean capital investment, ρλD − λ̇D =rD λD for dirty capital stock,
and ρλC − λ̇C =rC λC for clean capital stock.
Meanwhile, a representative firm uses clean and dirty capital to produce final goods and
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faces a profit maximization problem:
π(t)=F (KD (t),KC (t))−rD (t)KD (t)−

rC (t)
KC (t)−τ(t)P (KD (t),KC (t)),
Φ0(IC (t))

(C.2)

where instantaneous profits π are obtained by subtracting the costs of renting dirty and clean
capital owned by the household. The rate of return is rD for dirty capital, and the rate of return of
clean capital rC in unit of clean capital is converted to final goods units by dividing Φ0(IC ). The firm
problem is characterized by FKD =rD +τPKD and FKC = Φ0r(IcC ) +τPKC for dirty and clean capital,
respectively. Combining characterizations of both household and firm problems, the equilibrium is
characterized by: U 0(C) = λD , λD = Φ0(IC )λC , ρλD − λ̇D = (FKD −τPKD )λD = λD FKD −τλD PKD ,
and ρλC − λ̇C = (FKC − τPKC )Φ0(IC )λC = λD FKC − τλD PKC . It is easy to verify that by setting τ =

V 0 (P )
,
U 0 (C)

the equilibrium allocations are characterized by U 0(C) = λD , λD = Φ0(IC )λC ,

ρλD − λ̇D = (FKD − τPKD )λD = λD FKD − V 0(P )PKD , and ρλC − λ̇C = (FKC − τPKC )Φ0(IC )λC =
λD FKC −V 0(P )PKC , which is the same as the social optimum allocations.
With direct and indirect irreversibility of investment, the problem of the representative
household reads:
Z
max
∞

[C(t)]t=0

∞

e−ρtU(C(t))dt, s.t. K̇D (t)=π(t)+rD (t)KD (t)+rC (t)KC0 −C(t).

(C.3)

0

The household problem is characterized by U 0(C(t))=λD (t) for consumption and ρλD (t)− λ̇D (t)=
rD (t)λD (t) for dirty capital. Given investment irreversibility rules out clean capital accumulation,
clean capital stock remains unchanged at the initial condition KC0 . Meanwhile, the problem of
a representative firm reads:
π(t)=F (KD (t),KC0 )−rD (t)KD (t)−rC (t)KC0 −τ(t)P (KD (t),KC0 ).

(C.4)

The firm problem is characterized by FKD = rD + τPKD . The equilibrium allocation can be
characterized by: U 0(C) = λD and ρλD − λ̇D = (FKD − τPKD )λD = λD FKD − τλD PKD . Verify
that by setting τ =

V 0 (P )
,
U 0 (C)
0

the equilibrium allocations are characterized by U 0(C) = λD and

ρλD − λ̇D =λD FKD −V (P )PKD , which is the same as the social optimum allocations.
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Appendix D

Proof of Proposition 3

Stability of transitional dynamics is characterized by a 2×2 Jacobian matrix:
"
J(KD ,λD )≡

∂ K̇D
∂KD
∂ λ̇D
∂KD

∂ K̇D
∂λD
∂ λ̇D
∂λD

# "
=

− U100

FKD

#

V 00PK2 D +V 0PKD KD −λD FKD KD ρ−FKD

,

(D.1)

with the determinant of the Jacobian matrix given by det(J(KD , λD )) ≡ FKD (ρ − FKD ) +

V 00PK2 D +V 0PKD KD −λD FKD KD /U 00 < 0, where the negative sign follows from FKD > ρ, V 00 > 0,
PKD KD > 0, FKD KD < 0 and U 00 < 0. The two eigenvalues ξ characterizing the dynamic stability
take the following form:
ξ1 =

ρ−

p
p
ρ2 −4det(J(KD ,λD ))
ρ+ ρ2 −4det(J(KD ,λD ))
<0, ξ2 =
>0.
2
2

(D.2)

With det(J(KD ,λD )<0, the two eigenvalues is one positive and one negative, thus establishing
the saddle-path stability of transitional dynamics.
∗
To find the existence of steady state KD
, we impose stationery conditions on (7) and

rearranging yields
∗
F (KD
,KC0 )−C




∗
∗
V 0(P (KD
,KC0 ))PKD (KD
,KC0 )
=0.
∗
FKD (KD
,KC0 )−ρ

(D.3)

Define L:R+ →
7 R+ as a function of the variable KD
L(KD )≡F (KD ,KC0 )−C




V 0(P (KD ,KC0 ))PKD (KD ,KC0 )
,
FKD (KD ,KC0 )−ρ

(D.4)

and differentiating w.r.t. KD establishes the monotonicity of L(KD ) as follows:
L0(KD )=FKD −C 0

(V 00PK2 D +V 0PKD KD )(FKD −ρ)−V 0PKD FKD KD
>0.
(FKD −ρ)2

(D.5)

Verify that L(K) is strictly increasing in KD due to C 0 <0, V 00PK2 D +V 0PKD KD >0, V 0PKD FKD KD <
0, and FKD − ρ > 0. Furthermore, verify that limKD →0 L(KD ) → −∞ when
 KD → 0, be0P
V
K
D
cause limKD →0 F (KD ) = 0, limKD →0 V 0(P (KD )) = 0, and limKD →0 C FK −ρ
→ +∞. MeanD

while, when KD → +∞, we have limKD →+∞ L(KD ) → +∞ because limKD →+∞ F (KD ) → +∞,
V 0 PKD
) → 0.
−ρ
D

limKD →+∞ V 0(P (KD )) → +∞, and limKD →+∞ C( FK

Therefore, the continuity of the

strictly increasing function L(KD ) with limKD →0 L(KD ) → −∞ and limKD →+∞ L(KD ) → +∞
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∗
∗
ensures the existence of a unique KD
within (0,+∞) that satisfies L(KD
)=0.

Appendix E

Proof of Proposition 4

Imposing stationery conditions on (7) and rearranging yields:
∗
F (KD
,KC0 )−C




∗
∗
V 0(P (KD
,KC0 ))PKD (KD
,KC0 )
=0.
∗
FKD (KD
,KC0 )−ρ

(E.1)

∗
Total differentiating (E.1) with respect to KD
and V 0(P ) and rearranging yields:

∗
dKD
=
dV 0 F

P

C 0 FKKD−ρ
D

0
KD −C

2 +V 0 P
0
(V 00 PK
KD KD )(FKD −ρ)−V PKD FKD KD

<0,

(E.2)

D

(FKD −ρ)2

where the denominator of the right-hand side of (E.2) has a positive sign following from C 0 <0,
V 00PK2 D +V 0PKD KD >0, V 0PKD FKD KD <0, and FKD −ρ>0, and the nominator of the right-hand
side of (E.2) has a negative sign.
∗
We further example the relationship between KD
and KC0 . Total differentiating (E.1) with
∗
respect to KD
and KC0 and rearranging yields

∗
dKD
dKC0

C0
=

(V 00 PKD PKC +V 0 PKD KC )(FKD −ρ)−V 0 PKD FKD KC
(FKD −ρ)2

FKD −C

−FKC

2 +V 0 P
0
(V 00 PK
KD KD )(FKD −ρ)−V PKD FKD KD
D
0
(FKD −ρ)2

>0,

where the sign of the denominator of the right-hand side of (E.2) is positive. Meanwhile, for the nominator, we have FKC > 0, C 0 < 0, V 00PKD PKC +V 0PKD KC < 0, FKD −ρ > 0 and V 0PKD FKD KC > 0.
Given that the convexity of pollution damages ensures a sufficiently large value of marginal
pollution damages V 0(P ), the nominator has a positive sign.

Appendix F

Proof of Proposition 5

Environmental regulations that fully internalize the externality of pollution emissions from dirty
capital, as captured by the term V 00PK2 D +V 0PKD KD , lowers the value of detJ ↓ and leads to a shorter
time of convergence to steady state t∗ ↓. If both the absolute level and the rate of change of marginal
pollution damages are greater, i.e., V 0 ↑ and V 00 ↑, then the time of convergence to steady state
36
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is shorter t∗ ↓. In numerical examples, the pollution damage function is specified as V (P )=κP 2/2
where κ is the coefficient of marginal pollution damages. The larger the value of κ↑, the larger
the absolute level and rate of change for marginal pollution damages V 0 ↑ and V 00 ↑. Meanwhile,
when the initial stock of clean capital decreases KC0 ↓, it is easy to verify that PKD (KD ,KC0 ) ↑,
PKD KD (KD ,KC0 )↑, and the term V 00PK2 D +V 0PKD KD increases. The determinant of the Jacobian
matrix thus decreases detJ ↓. From (8), the time of convergence to steady state becomes shorter.

Appendix G

Proof of Proposition 6



D
Following F (ψKD , ψKC ) = ψF (KD , KC ), we let ψ = 1/KC and obtain f(k) ≡ F K
,1
=
KC
 
1
D
F (KD ,KC ), where k ≡ K
. Applying the Euler’s theorem to F (KD ,KC ) yields f 0(k) =
KC
KC


D
FKD K
,1 = FKD (KD , KC ), where F (KD , KC ) is homogenous of degree (HoD) one and
KC
FKD (KD ,KC ) is HoD
following P (ψKD ,ψKC ) = ψν P (KD ,KC ) ∀ψ ∈ R+,
 zero.
 Furthermore,
ν
D
D
we obtain p(k)≡P K
,1 = K1C P (KD ,KC ) where k = K
. Applying the Euler’s theorem to
KC
KC

  ν−1
D
P (KD ,KC ) yields p0(k)=PKD K
PKD (KD ,KC ), where P (KD ,KC ) is HoD ν and
,1 = K1C
KC
PKD (KD ,KC ) is HoD ν−1 in KD and KC .
Derivations of the intensive-form expressions of the characterization equations (13) are as
follows. First, the Euler equation is rewritten as:

 

Ċ
V 0(P )PKD (KD ,KC )
CPKD (KD ,KC )
=θ FKD (KD ,KC )−ρ−
=θ FKD (KD ,KC )−ρ−
,
C
U 0(C)
P (KD ,KC )
where FKD (KD ,KC ) = FKD





KD
,1
KC

≡ f 0(k). Given that P (KD ,KC ) is HoD ν and PKD (KD ,KC )

is HoD ν−1, we have

C

PKD (KD ,KC ) C
=
P (KD ,KC )
KC

1
KC



ν−1

1
KC

PKD (KD ,KC )

ν

P (KD ,KC )



KD
P
,1
C KD KD KC
p0(k)

 =ck
=
,
KD KC P KD ,1
p(k)
KC

(G.1)

C
D
D
D
where c:= K
, k := K
, p(k):=P ( K
,1) and p0(k)=PKD ( K
,1).
KC
KC
KC

Second, from the law of motion for KC and KD , we have,


K̇C F (KD ,KC )−C − K̇D
KD
C KD K̇D KD
=
=F
,1 −
−
=f(k)−ck−gk,
KC
KC
KC
KD KC KD KC

(G.2)
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D
where f(k):=F ( K
,1).
KC

Finally, equalization of instantaneous marginal benefits between dirty and clean capital
accumulation is given by:
V 0(P )
(PKC (KD ,KC )−PKD (KD ,KC ))=FKC (KD ,KC )−FKD (KD ,KC ),
U 0(C)

(G.3)

where the right-hand side of (G.3) can be rewritten as


KD
F (KD ,KC )−FKD KD
KD
FKC −FKD =
−FKD =F
,1 −FKD
−FKD =f(k)−(1+k)f 0(k).
KC
KC
KC
Using the Euler’s theorem yields FKD KD + FKC KC = F (KD ,KC ). Furthermore, given that
P (KD ,KC ) is HoD ν, the Euler’s theorem yields PKD KD +PKC KC = νP and PKC =

νP −PKD KD
,
KC

and we hence have


C KD KD C
V0
C
C νP −PKD KD
p0(k)
P
=
P
=
P
=νck−kck
.
=ν
−
K
K
K
U0 C P C P
KC
KD KC KC P D
p(k)
0 (k)
V0
P (KD ,KC )= C
PKD (KD ,KC )=ck pp(k)
U 0 KD
P
h
i
p0 (k)
V0
(P
−P
)=ck
ν−(1+k)
.
KC
KD
U0
p(k)

Given
by

(G.4)

in (G.1), the left-hand side of (G.3) is rewritten

Rewriting (13c) yields
ck =

(1+k)f 0(k)−f(k)
0

(k)
(1+k) pp(k)
−ν

,

(G.5)

and taking the logarithm on both sides and differentiating with respect to time t yields


p0 (k)
p(k)p00 (k)−p0 (k)2
+k(1+k)
k
2
p(k)
p(k)
ċ k̇  (1+k)f (k)k
 k̇ ,
+ =
−
0 (k)
p
0
c k
(1+k)f (k)−f(k)
k
(1+k) p(k) −ν


00

 0˙ 
p (k)

(G.6)

p(k)p00 (k)−p0 (k)2
p(k)2


k̇. Rear-



p0 (k)
p(k)p00 (k)−p0 (k)2
k
+k(1+k)
2
p(k)
p(k)
ċ  (1+k)(f (k)k−f (k))+f(k)
 k̇ :=φ(k) k̇ ,
=
−
0 (k)
p
0
c
(1+k)f (k)−f(k)
k
k
(1+k) p(k) −ν

(G.7)

where

d((1+k)f 0 (k)−f(k))
dt

0

= d((1+k)fdk(k)−f(k)) k̇ = (1+k)f 00(k)k̇, and

p(k)

=



ranging (G.6) yields


00

0

where the last equality defines φ(k) as a function of k.
Substituting (13a)-(13b) into ċc =φ(k) kk̇ and rearranging yields the endogenous growth rate
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g as a function of k:

g :=g(k)=



q0 (k)
0
θ f (k)−ρ+ck q(k) +φ(k)(f(k)−ck)
1+φ(k)(1+k)

,

(G.8)

where the function φ(k) is given by
p0 (k)

p(k)p00 (k)−p0 (k)2

(1+k)(kf 00(k)−f 0(k))+f(k) k p(k) +k(1+k)
p(k)2
φ(k)=
−
0
(1+k)f 0(k)−f(k)
(1+k) p (k) −ν

.

(G.9)

p(k)

Then substituting (G.8) into (13b)-(13c) obtain (16).

References
D. Acemoglu. Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. Princeton University Press, 2009.
D. Acemoglu, P. Aghion, L. Bursztyn, and D. Hemous. The environment and directed technical
change. American Economic Review, 102:131–166, 2012.
D. Acemoglu, P. Aghion, and D. Hmous. The environment and directed technical change in a
northsouth model. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 30(3):513–530, 2014.
M. Allen, D. Frame, C. Huntingford, C. Jones, J. Lowe, M. Meinshausen, and N. Meinshausen.
Warming caused by cumulative carbon emissions towards the trillionth tonne. Nature, 458:
1163–1166, 2009.
S. Anderson and R. Newell. Prospects for carbon capture and storage technologies. Annual
Review of Environment and Resources, 29(1):109–142, 2004.
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